

SANCTIONS AS TOOL FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF TARGETED SANCTIONS IN RUSSIA

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Amaechi Fidelis NWADOR

nwador.amaechi@delsu.edu.ng

Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria

Franklins A. SANUBI

Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria

Esekumemu Victor CLARK

Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria

Abstract: *Strategic deterrence through the use of sanctions in the international system is gaining support among major players. This is despite widespread scepticism over the instrument's efficacy, as seen by the widespread opposition to its use immediately following its implementation in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The takeover of Ukraine is the first opportunity since World War II to analyse the results of sanctions on a major power and permanent member of the UN Security Council. The issue raises the question of whether or not sanctions on Russia would be an effective strategy in stopping their aggressiveness in Ukraine. In this article, we analyse how targeted sanctions against Russia's economy can alter the course of the conflict in Ukraine. Given the energy linkages that most of these governments have with Russia, we see the sanctions' proponents the United States, the European Union, and the Baltic States suffering increasingly negative consequences. We also contextualise the acts of sanction busters empowered by the United States' inability to develop a consensus at the United Nations General Assembly and by Russia's veto to thwart the criminalization of their conduct in the United Nations Security Council. Despite this, it is becoming apparent that Russia's economy is feeling the effects of the sanctions, which is substantially diminishing their ability to properly prosecute the war. Methodologically, the study used a historical approach, meaning that it relied on information gathered from previously existing sources including encyclopaedias, encyclopaedia articles, and news stories. In conclusion, the data appears to bolster the view that the possible risk spawned in the harsh reality of targeted or comprehensive sanctions on Russia given the extent of the punishment regime is an acceptable price for the maintenance of the rule-based international order.*

Keyword: *Targeted, sanctions, deterrence, Busters, United Nations*

Introduction

When major powers' traditional tools for dealing with international troublemakers like war and hard force diplomacy fail them, they increasingly turn to sanctions as their primary method of influence. The use of sanctions has increased significantly since the end of the cold war, despite the fact that they have not been able to stop the psychopathic tendencies and despotism of actors like Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who annexed Kuwait, Kim Jong-government in North Korea, or Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the recalcitrant dictator and supreme leader of Iran. Empirical research undertaken by Hufbauer (cited in Sitt, et al., 2010) found that fines were only partially successful in about 34% of cases that were not completely probed. As a result, sanctions cannot be cast out as a fully ineffectual weapon

for maintaining international peace and security. So, we reasoned that the conditions surrounding its deployment, its legality, the capacity of the sanctioning authority and the sanctioned state, and the degree of acceptability may really determine the efficacy of sanctions, which constituted the foundation of our study. Given this, we will assess how well punishment functions as a deterrence after considering events like the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Sanctions are not new; they were used in the USSR, for example, when the West put technological penalties on the country that served to keep it technologically behind the West (Aslund & Snegovaya, 2021). This played a crucial role in the approval of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the United States Trade Act in 1974. For the United States, it was critical that the Soviet Union end its restriction on the emigration of Russian Jews before normal commercial relations could be resumed. Naturally, the Soviets caved in to the amendment's demands and allowed a mass exodus of Soviet Jews, returning things to the way they were before the amendment was passed (Aslund & Snegovaya, 2021). There has been a wave of Western sanctions on Russia since 2014 due to Russia's persistent breaches of international accords and its annexation of Crimea. There have been instances where the United States has unilaterally imposed sanctions with the support of her Western allies. None of the proposals, however, have been adopted globally or by the United Nations (UN). Russia and Ukraine have been at war since 2014, when Putin launched an invasion of Ukraine he dubbed a "special military operation" despite Western sanctions. Taking into account the effect Western sanctions have had on civilian entities entitled to protection under international law and the actions of emerging alliances and sanction busters, we hope this evaluation will help us determine the efficacy of sanctions as a deterrence strategy against Russian aggression.

Conceptual and theoretical Discourse

Sanctions

Sanctions, according to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007), help spread democracy and keep the peace across the world. These kinds of coercive measures are intended to supplement more passive strategies like diplomacy and development aid, which are aimed at the same ends. A state, organization, or its leaders may be prevented from doing action if penalties are imposed on them. They have been mandated by a worldwide agreement among nations. This is done because the international community generally favors economic and political measures as peaceful means to influence the behavior of a State, group, or individual. They can be used to persuade a government to end systematic abuse of human rights, to introduce democratic changes, or to alter the policies of a government that threatens international stability. Because they are regulated by law, sanctions represent a distinctive method of conducting foreign policy. They're intricately designed, and there are repercussions for disobeying them. These sanctions are supposed to be temporary and will be reviewed often to account for any shifts. They are to be torn down once their function has been fulfilled (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2007). Because it offers important background for sanctions—including a discussion of their scope and length—the aforementioned explanation from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was chosen. Even if not everyone here agrees with the previous definition, we feel it is important to demonstrate the range of opinions that inform this study. The definition's claim that sanctions are used to bolster international security is, however, incorrect, in our

opinion. This thesis argues differently, elaborating on how sanctions may be counterproductive to peace in some contexts and how they have historically failed to achieve global stability.

It may also be confusing to understand that penalties are a valid part of the legal system. We agree that they are legitimate instruments under the UN Charter, but the imposition of economic penalties violates the "right to live in dignity" established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We argue that the adverse effects and traits typically associated with economic sanctions put the citizens of a target state in danger and deprive them of the possibility to live in dignity. According to Margaret P. Doxey, sanctions are "penalties imposed or applied as a stated result of the target's failure to maintain international standards or international duties" (Doxey, 1996, p.9). It is a harsh assumption to make that every person from the sanctioned zone is personally liable for the actions that resulted in the sanctions. Such generalizations are used to tarnish the reputations of innocent bystanders and provide cover for those who might otherwise resort to physical action. Penalties have been defined as a "broad spectrum of remedies decided individually or collectively by States against the perpetrator of an internationally unlawful activity" with the goal of ensuring the observance and fulfilment of a right or duty (Decaux, 2008, p.249). According to Laura Forlati Picchio, sanctions "would be any activity that is adverse to the interests of the State at fault, that serves the purpose of compensation, punishment, or potentially prevention and that is spelled out in or simply not barred by international law." As cited on page 249 of Decaux (2008). As an alternative to using physical force, sanctions are an attempt to persuade the other party to change their behavior. Sanctions can have unintended, devastating consequences for people's lives that are difficult to foresee and impossible to repair. Yet another success is that they have managed to change the strategy of their opponents. Sanctions and the threat of sanctions have been shown effective in addressing a variety of concerns, including human rights violations, violent regime change, and the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (Shane, 2004). Our argument is that no matter how well-intentioned the entities implementing the sanctions may be, any action or measure that has serious humanitarian effects on the civilian population is wrong, regardless of whether or not it fits into one of the categories listed above. Financial sanctions have often failed to achieve their intended results (Wallenstein, 2000, pp.5-6). In reality, they exacerbate the hardships of innocent bystanders, whose plights they otherwise intend to ease.

Objectives and Purposes of Sanctions

Sanctions are a tool utilized widely in the international system to accomplish a wide range of aims. Bolton (2019) argues that sanctions may be used to deter the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), punish those responsible for human rights abuses, advance national security goals, and make the world a safer place. The purposes of penalties may be broken down into three groups, according to Sitt. That is, in addition to upholding peace treaties and meeting treaty obligations, the sanctioning state's domestic and worldwide prestige are secondary considerations. And as a tertiary goal, is maintaining global order and structure (Sitt et al. 2010; pages 21–25). Sanctioning states or organizations requires strong evidence of disapproval for the actions being punished. Such a sequence of action is obviously more than just words or a resolution. One of its goals is to satisfy the

preferences of a group of people at home or to prevent the application of a moral judgement. All of these groups, as described by Sitt et al. (2010), are driven by the wish to alter policy, exact retribution, prevent further instability in a certain area, or deter the outbreak of war. Sanctions are used primarily to encourage new course corrections. Despite their permanence, actions can sometimes be reversed. A regime change is a radical alteration in government policies. This occurs when a sizeable portion of the world community sees a state's behavior as so abhorrent and intolerable that the only remedy is to install new leadership.

The contrary is true when an action is highly condemned, such as in a penalty. A guilty verdict from an international criminal court might be handed down as punishment for disobedient actors. Sanctions can also be used for containment, which entails placing restrictions on trade with the sanctioned nation. The ultimate goal of any form of punishment is to prevent future offences. The efficacy of punishments is determined by how much they lessen the possibility that a state would engage in the illegal behaviour again. It is challenging to evaluate the usefulness of mechanisms like sanctions and international criminal courts that are used as part of the deterrence logic (Sitt, 2010).

The Nexus between Deterrence and Sanctions

Deterrence is just one part of many other diplomatic plans. In recent years, the concept's focus has switched away from the nuclear threat and toward the calculation of conventional military deterrence. According to Mueller (2018), deterrence occurs when an individual or group decides not to pursue an activity because they fear unfavorable repercussions. Although the tool has a wide range of potential uses, such as nuclear crisis management and crime prevention (Kleiman, 2009), the focus of this article is on its application in averting armed conflict between nations. It is not enough to make war look costly or risky; deterrence rests on making war appear more unwanted than the alternatives (Mueller, 2021). Most countries believe the current state of affairs is acceptable, making deterrence a simple matter if the enemy shares this view. There is always the possibility that some really desperate administration or some exceptionally bellicose individual may choose war anyhow. When presented with a variety of undesirable choices, such as peace or war, Japan in 1941 is a paradigmatic illustration of this phenomenon (Mueller, 2021, p.48). It is easy to see how states may make aggression look less appealing than other choices. The two main tactics most commonly associated with deterrence are "increasing the expected cost of aggression through threats of punishments (punitive deterrence) and making it appear unlikely that aggression will be successful in achieving its objectives (deterrence by denial)," where "aggression" can be defined as "the appearance of aggression's success in achieving its objectives," regardless of the (Mueller, 2021, p.55)

Foreign policy tools such as sanctions are intrinsically linked to the idea of deterrence. Using Rhodesia sanctions as an example, Giumelli argues that sanctions may have two effects: punishing the guilty and intimidating the innocent (Giumelli, 2021) In both cases, sanctions are applied on the naïve belief that doing so would provide a political advantage proportional to the severity of the economic pain placed on the receiver. There are two perspectives on using physical pain as a form of punishment from the perspective of deterrence. Penalties are put in place to deter bad behavior, such as an escalation of a fight, from happening again. Second, punishment for an offender alters the perception of the

repercussions of that offender's acts by other actors (or potential targets). In both cases, the receivers are threatened with negative effects if the sender does not stop the recipient from engaging in inappropriate behavior. In this context, international sanctions are seen largely as a political instrument on the global stage (Hufbauer et al. 2007). The first known example of such a decree is the Athens-issued Megarian edict, which is described in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian wars. The towns of the Delian league imposed a complete trade ban on Megara as part of the punishments. All around the world, armies of the Middle Ages utilized the same tactics to besiege castles and cities as they did when they fought for supremacy (Gravett, 2007). In light of this, it is possible that the economic damage on the inhabitants may be avoided if the rulers chose to open the gates and agree to the (often fluctuating) conditions of the besiegers. Although states were given significant roles in international politics after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the practice of limiting trade for political reasons remained. The purpose of the United States' threat of sanctions against France and Britain was to "convince Great Britain and France to rethink their harsh decision on seizing neutral American ships" (Guimelli, 2011). (Frankel, 1982 cited in Giumelli, 2021). The use of sanctions, however, was also widely acknowledged as a tool of shaping the future behavior of states. Foley remembered President Wilson's suggestion that sanctions be implemented as a "silent and deadly treatment" to avert repeat hostilities in the debates that followed World War I. (Foley cited in Giumelli, 2021).

To discourage and, ideally, prohibit hostile behaviors from any state, Wilson advocated that they be subject to sanctions in the form of an all-encompassing embargo. To rephrase, the League of Nations' collective security system of sanctions was the progenitor of deterrent methods before the nuclear age. Following the failure of sanctions-based deterrence in halting Italian colonial expansion into Abyssinia in 1936, nuclear weapons were able to completely destroy the basis of international law governing such attempts (Strang, 2013). Studies reveal that sanctions were used during the Cold War; nonetheless, they were linked to deterrence for undesirable behaviors that constituted a smaller threat compared to nuclear deterrence. Case studies in a fundamental study on sanctions published in 1990 reveal that sanctions have been used often to promote democratic processes, to resist Apartheid, and to destabilize governments, among many other goals (Hufbauer et al. 1990). The idea behind deterrence is that governments will be less inclined to participate in certain behaviors if they are punished for doing so. Foreign policy instruments, or sanctions, have traditionally been used by nations against other states, but curiously, events constantly altering the form and use of sanctions as weapon for deterrence (or by similar political actors before the Treaty of Westphalia, such as cities, empires, and the like).

Historical Perspective on Sanctions

Using economic penalties as a tool of statecraft has been used since at least the 5th century. They were very much like the punishments Athens handed down on Megara in 432 B.C.13 (Giumelli, 2021). At the time, a politician named Pericles in Athens forbade trade with the Megara Empire because of its backing for Sparta, a City-State that was an enemy of the Athenian Empire. With this threat, Athens made it clear that it would take action against anybody who challenged its authority in any way, even by military force (Thucydides, 1972, p.118). Woodrow Wilson, the then-President of the United States, issued a

proclamation after World War One that formalized the use of sanctions in international politics. He suggested sanctions be used by the League of Nations to assist maintain international peace. Sanctions, in his view, are "a quiet, silent, fatal therapy" (Gordon, 1999, p.124). Throughout the whole century, sanctions were rarely imposed. During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States collaborated with and backed corrupt and cruel dictators in an effort to get an upper hand over their opponent (Shane, 2004). Because of this tactic, sanctions were both ineffective and unpopular. Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the United Nations only recognized Rhodesia and South Africa. As a new era began after the end of the Cold War, sanctions were withdrawn from a new set of countries.

Civil wars have broken out in a number of countries, as detailed by Hughes (2007). These include Iraq in 1990, the former Yugoslavia in 1991, 1992, and 1998, Libya in 1992, Liberia in 1992, Somalia in 1992, parts of Cambodia in 1992, Haiti in 1993, parts of Angola in 1993, 1997, and 1998, Rwanda in 1994, Sudan in 1996, Sierra Leone in 1997, Afghanistan in 1999, and others. There were several factors that led to their exclusion, including foreign and internal enmity, the suppression of democracy, and their support for terrorism (Chan and Drury, 2000). Now that the United States has acquired its current degree of global preeminence, its unilateral sanctions have more weight. Scholars like Haass (1998) and Delevic (1998) argue that the United States should use unilateral sanctions more often in order to protect U.S. economic interests and because it is unwilling to use military force to address economic, moral, and political concerns. Analysis from 1998 indicates that "two-thirds of the world's population was subject to some sort of US sanctions" (Dunne, 1998, p.2).

However, the United States isn't the only country to impose financial penalties; the European Union has also supported its own set of sanctions. Several parties and professionals have argued that economic sanctions shouldn't be utilized because of the harm they would cause to civilian populations. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott's (1990) investigation on sanctions was extremely comprehensive; the authors examined 116 case studies spanning from the beginning of the twentieth century to the end of the Cold War. The most important finding from their study was that fines had a poor track record in terms of performance, causation, and effect (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, 1990). Some people thought the original UN sanctions on South Africa and Rhodesia had some kind of impact. The effectiveness of using sanctions to push these nations into modifying their behavior has contributed significantly to the prominence that sanctions presently enjoy in international politics. If I may say so, it is astounding how effective "normal" sanctions were in bringing down the apartheid regime. The success of sanctions on the apartheid regime has been trumpeted, although experts have raised serious doubts about these claims. Some, like Philip Levy, argue that the events of South Africa can never happen again (Levy, 1999 p.10-12). Attempting to extrapolate the results of sanctions on the apartheid regime in South Africa to any other situation would be absurd. Legal positivists agree with Levy that sanctions are a violation of human rights and the UN declaration of rights, but they argue that Levy is wrong to draw this conclusion. Both are said to be incoherent and mutually contradictory. For her part, Joy Gordon supports this motion since she considers economic constraints to be a kind of warfare (Gordon, 1999, p.149). The conservative Heritage Foundation in the United States is another "think tank" that is against sanctions. Instead, it emphasizes the risks of falling into the trap of employing sanctions as a key tool

of foreign policy and warns against the potential harm that might befall everybody involved. The UN's analysis of sanctions from the perspective of human rights and the integration of legal principles of international law may be found in the "Bossuyt Report," which was authored by a researcher with the organization. The document criticizes how the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council typically consider sanctions, saying that "hardly any reference to human rights and humanitarian law principles" is made (Bossuyt, 2000, p.4).

General Information about UN Sanctions

By the time the Cold War ended in 1990, the United Nations had established just two sanctions regimes. "(Gowlland-Debbas, 2004)" Rhodesia's white minority rule under Ian Smith prompted the country's 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the imposition of the world's first compulsory sanctions. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 253 (1968), which imposed an absolute trade embargo on Rhodesia and made it unlawful for any country to carry commodities into or out of Rhodesia. In the wake of this, mandatory sanctions were imposed on the apartheid government in South Africa in 1977. (UNSCR 418, 1977). For example, resolution 418 (1977) banned the sale of weapons to the government of South Africa. After the Cold War ended in the late 1980s and early 1990s, ties between the United States and the Soviet Union (later renamed the Russian Federation) improved, allowing Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to function more efficiently. On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, ushering in a new era in international politics that culminated in resolution 661 of 1990 from the Security Council. Reference: (Gordon et al., 2019). This ruling effectively banned all trade between Iraq and any other country, including the prohibition of the export of items manufactured in Iraq or Kuwait and the prohibition of all imports into Iraq. Many people felt that the sanctions system put an undue burden on regular Iraqis after Saddam Hussein was deposed in 2003. (Weiss, et al, 1997). There were reports of a huge increase in disease and hunger as a result of sanctions imposed on the country (Gordon et al, 2019).

Because of the military coup in Iraq the previous year and its similarity to the one in Haiti, Chapter VII sanctions were enacted that year. The shipment of petroleum products and military equipment to Haiti was prohibited in 1993 by Resolution 841. (Gordon et al, 2019). Although the sanctions were intended to target the Iraqi government specifically, they were widely regarded to have contributed significantly to the rising infant mortality rate in the country. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called sanctions a "blunt instrument" in a 1995 report to the Security Council. In addition, he questioned if it was moral to harm so many people to influence political leaders. His findings include that the "Security Council's greatly heightened use of this instrument [Article 41] has brought to light a number of issues, referring particularly to the purposes of sanctions, the monitoring of their implementation and efficacy, and their unintended effects." Multiple studies (Gordon et al., 2019) have found tha.

Table 1

Regime	Authorizing Resolution	Start Date	End Date	Situation/Motivation
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Rhodesia	SCR 253(1968)	05/1968	12/1979	Declaration of independence by white minority regime in Rhodesia
South Africa	SCR 421(1977)	12/1977	05/1994	Apartheid regime in South Africa
Iraq	SCR 661 (1990)	08/1990	05/2003	Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
Yugoslavia	SCR 713 (1991)	09/1991	10/1991	Outbreak of fighting in Republic of Yugoslavia
Libya	SCR 748(1992)	03/1992	09/2003	Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie
Liberia	SCR 985 (1995)	11/1992	03/1994	Liberia civil war
Haiti	SCR 841 (1993)	06/1993	09/1994	Military coup against Aristide government
Angola	SCR 864 (1993)	09/1993	12/2002	Deterioration of internal political situation
Rwanda	SCR 1011 (1995)	08/1995	07/2008	Instability in Rwanda after the civil war
Sierra Leone	SCR 1132 (1997)	10/1997	09/2010	Sierra Leone civil war
Kosovo	SCR 1160 (1998)	03/1998	09/2001	Violence by Serbian forces in Kosovo; terrorist acts of Kosovo Liberation Army
Eritrea/Ethiopia	SCR 1298 (2000)	05/2000	05/2001	Hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia
Liberia	SCR 1343 (2001)	03/2001	12/2001	Liberian support for rebels in Sierra Leone
Iran	SCR 1343 (2001)	12/2006	01/2016	Iran's failure to halt its uranium enrichment programme
Cote d'Ivoire	SCR 1572 (2004)	11/2004	06/2016	Internal hostilities
CURRENT SANCTION REGIMES				
Regime	Sanctioning Resolution	Start Date		Situation/motivation
Somalia	SCR 733 (1992)	01/1992		Escalating violence in Somalia
Al-Qaida, ISIL	SCR 1267 (1999)	10/1999		International terrorism
Iraq	SCR 1483 (2003)	05/2003		Deposed Iraqi regime
Liberia	SCR 1521 (2003)	12/2003		Continuing internal violence
Democratic Republic of Congo	SCR 1493 (2003)	07/2003		Internal hostilities and the exploitation of natural resources
Sudan	SCR 1556 (2004)	10/2004		Atrocities committed by Janjaweed militia
Lebanon	SCR 1636 (2005)	10/2005		Investigations of ICC into assassination of Rafiq Hariri
DPRK	SCR 1718 (2006)	10/2006		DPRK nuclear programme
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	SCR 1970 (2011)	10/2011		Conflict in Libya and use of force against civilians
Afghanistan	SCR 1988 (2011)	06/2011		Taliban activities in Afghanistan
Guinea-Bissau	SCR 2048 (2012)	05/2012		Military coup against democratically elected government
Central African Republic	SCR 2127 (2013)	12/2013		Breakdown of law and order, and intersectorian tensions in CAR
Yemen	SCR 2140 (2014)	03/2015		Conflict between Government of Republic of South Sudan and opposition forces

Source: Author's compilation from Gowlland-Debbas, (2004); Bolton, (2021)

The Legal Basis of UN Sanctions

The Charter is a multilateral treaty adopted by 193 states that serves as one of the most significant foundations of international law. As stated in the Charter's Preamble, one of the fundamental goals of the United Nations is to "establish conditions under which justice and respect for the duties originating from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained" (UN Charter, Preamble, para 3.). A UN Member State's Charter commitments take precedence over its responsibilities under any other international treaty, as stated in Article 103 of the Charter. It will become clear that the compliance of Member States with United Nations sanctions regimes is critically dependent on the recognition of the priority of United Nations responsibilities above other international commitments. United Nations Charter Article 7(1) makes the Security Council, one of the UN's core organizations, responsible for adopting international sanctions regimes. According to Article 24(1) and (2) of the UN Charter, the Council may use the powers provided to it in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII in order to fulfil its responsibility to maintain international security. Threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression are discussed in Chapter VII of the Charter, which may result in the implementation of sanctions. In instance, Article 41 of the Charter grants the Security Council the ability to impose mandatory measures, including "the entire or partial severance of commercial relations," that do not include the use of armed force. However, rather than specifying a specific article of the Charter, like Article 41, most resolutions imposing sanctions merely declare that they were authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter.

For Chapter VII actions to be taken, the Security Council must first make the determination that a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" exists, as required by Article 39 of the Charter. Given the ambiguity of the phrase "threat to the peace," there has been extensive debate concerning the circumstances under which the Security Council may resort to force. While Chapter VII resolutions are technically determinations under Article 41, in practice it is accepted that they include an implicit conclusion under Article 39. (UNSC 54, 1948). It is essential for the execution of sanctions regimes that Member States be obligated to execute measures agreed by the Security Council, as stated in Article 41. Article 25 of the Charter states that all Member States must adhere to and carry out all Security Council resolutions. In accordance with a ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Security Council resolutions have binding legal effect (Gordon et al, 2019). As a result, the UNSC has the power to ensure that its members carry out their resolutions. In addition, Article 103 of the Charter states that the Charter's obligations (including those imposed by a Security Council resolution) would have precedence over obligations under any other international treaty.

Although it has been claimed that the United Nations Security Council is "unbound by law" (Oosthuizen, 1999), the vast majority of academics now accept that the Council's decision-making ability is constrained. Since there is no judicial review system at the UN level, the limits of these freedoms are not well defined (Farrall, 2007) The inability to directly dispute UN judgments in a recognized legal setting has been a major bone of contention with UN sanctions for quite some time. This matter was crucial in the European Court of Justice case known as Kadi I since it included one of the main issues (ECJ). This was found to be the case (Kadi & Al Barakaat, 2008). However, it is important to briefly discuss the most hotly contested limitations on the Security Council's capacity to impose sanctions under

Article 41 of the Charter. You may classify them into three groups: (i) those that rely on the ultra vires clause of the Charter; (ii) those that rely on the jus cogens rules of customary international law; and (iii) those that rely on the state accountability regime on countermeasures (the countermeasures argument).

Types of sanctions

Opone & Kelikuma (2022) provided a hint as to the types of sanctions that could be implemented by defining them as "punitive actions such as ban, embargo, prohibition, restriction, boycott, and barrier in terms of political, economic, military, or even diplomatic terms against a country or institution to elicit favorable response." It should be noted, however, that there is a wide range of categories to which these sanctions might be grouped. Arms embargoes, admissions restrictions (such as visa or travel bans), and other measures as deemed appropriate make up the other 49 types of penalties that fall under these headings (European Commission, 2008). The Strategic Planning Unit of the Executive Office of the UN Secretary General noted in 1999 that there is widespread agreement among nations that, when dealing with serious violations of international law, the international community requires a means of coercion somewhere between diplomatic rebuke and military conflict. Alternatives to punishments for this function do not exist (Mack and Khan, 1999, p.104). Between more passive diplomatic strategies and the use of force, sanctions are considered as a middle ground. Since this is the case, sanctions can be used to prevent conflict in the event that diplomacy fails.

Full-Fledged Sanctions

When put into effect, comprehensive economic sanctions isolate the sanctioned state from all kinds of international trade, finance, and service provision (Doxey, 1996, p.139). Broad economic sanctions have the effect of cutting off a country's access to international markets and other sources of money and assistance, with the exception of humanitarian necessity (Doxey, 1996, pp.139-40). Rhodesia, South Africa, Yugoslavia, and Iraq are the only countries other than Ukraine that have been hit with such severe economic sanctions since the United Nations' foundation (House of Lords, 2006-07, p.14). With the assistance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the United States and the European Union have joined the United Nations (UN) in imposing harsh sanctions (IMF). Russia has been hit hard by the severe economic sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union with the support of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international organizations.

Even though significant economic sanctions were imposed on both Rhodesia and South Africa, the purpose of the penalties was only partially realized in both situations (Watson Institute for International Studies, 2004). Most of Iraq's concessions were obtained via the use of force and sanctions. Global economic sanctions may not have been successful in attaining crucial goals if they were not preceded by or supported by the threat or use of force (Watson institute for international studies, 2004). It wasn't until the late 1990s that politicians and scholars like Baldwin (1985), Tostenson and Bull (2002), and Andreas (1999) began to challenge the effectiveness of comprehensive sanctions (2005). Humanitarian effects were a primary target of critics because of how catastrophic they were for civilian populations. "I do not think that comprehensive economic sanctions should

ever be imposed, on any nation, ever again," Carne Ross, the UK's first secretary at the UN from 1999 to 2003, said. "I think that comprehensive economic sanctions should never be imposed, on any country, ever again" (House of Lords, 2006-07: 16). The harsh economic realities that the Iraqi people were prepared to confront is directly correlated to the almost half a million fatalities that have been attributed to the punishment system (Mueller, 2021). Hans Von Sponeck, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq between 1998 and 2000, disagreed with Carne Ross, saying that humanitarian exclusions were adequate to "lower the enormity of the human costs of comprehensive economic sanctions sufficiently to make its usage legitimate" (House of Lords, 2006-07, p.16). By allowing for humanitarian exemptions, Von Sponeck suggests, monetary sanctions will appear less brutal than they actually are. Dr. Kim Howells, a British politician, also argues in favour of economic sanctions by saying: I do not think we can abandon the weapon of comprehensive sanctions because there will be situations in the future, as I suspect there may even be at the moment, where comprehensive sanctions probably could do more good than damage (House of Lords, 2006-07 p.16).

The Watson Institute concluded that the potential political benefits of imposing such high economic sanctions generally exceed the suffering of people. Full economic penalties not only hinder the work of humanitarian organisations, they also hurt the targeted countries' capacity to produce goods in the long run and unfairly penalise their neighbours, who are often their principal trading partners (Weiss; Cortright; Lopez and Minear, 1997, p.17). In response to these arguments against comprehensive sanctions and rising calls to reform sanctions instruments, the international community has shifted its stance and adopted targeted sanctions directed at policymakers responsible for reprehensible policies and the elites who benefit from and support them.

Targeted sanctions

Recent years have seen what appears to be a major trend toward targeted or "smart" solutions, with hopes that they may improve penalty regimes and policy emphases. This tactic, which is crucial to the application of tailored punishments, is also known as the "individualization of penalties" (Herik, 2017). It is preferable to punish the specific people, groups, or governments responsible for the wrongdoing than generalizing about them. The most prevalent form of these penalties is a complete freeze of the targeted persons' or organizations' financial assets and a ban on any further provision of financial or other resources to or for the benefit of the sanctioned parties (Watson Institute for International Studies, 2004, p.3). This can also be used to prevent a certain group, organization, or person from leaving the nation. Targeted approaches seem to counter the criticisms of blanket sanctions straight on and make intuitive sense as well. Instead of punishing innocent individuals, penalties should be directed at those responsible for the actions that have drawn worldwide condemnation. If this is the case, then individualized sanctions may help lessen the destructive humanitarian effects of blanket sanctions. If well-planned and executed, targeted sanctions will only have an impact on tyrants, demagogues, and rebel leaders and their adherents (Watson Institute for International Studies, 2004, p.3).

While these types of sanctions have just recently been added to the United Nations' "toolbox," they have been in use for quite some time. The evidence presented before the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials was made available to the public. The tribunal set up following WWII was responsible for punishing anyone found culpable for international crimes

(Greppi, 1990, pp.4-7). Article 41 of the UN Charter provides for multilateral sanctions, however they have never been enforced. However, the end of the Cold War heralded a new era in the functioning of the Security Council (Hanhimäki, 2008, p.11). The Council's decision-making process has evolved to the point where more cases involving punishment can be heard. It was necessary to lift the sanctions since they were effective but destructive to the general populace. The obvious results of these sanctions in Iraq have cast doubt on the effectiveness of economic penalties more generally. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have released reports detailing the ongoing crisis, which includes famine and malnutrition, the collapse of the national health care system, the spread of diseases, and power outages (Watson Institute for International Studies, 2004).

The demand for harsher penalties has increased as a result of these concerns. The United Nations Security Council opted to soften the sanctions system in response to public outcry, making it less likely to harm innocent bystanders. The council was able to pass more targeted penalties as a consequence. Once it was determined that an individual or group of persons constituted a bigger threat to international stability than a whole state, sanctions were the next logical step (Gordon, 1999, pp.315-20). Those who are subject to sanctions are sent a clear message that their conduct have been considered worthy of punishment when they are punished for specific behaviors as opposed to an entire category, like internal disputes within a state. It's a monumental deed that might discourage other nations from offering aid to the deposed government. The first time such sanctions were applied was in 1992 against the government of Libya; in 1994 they were used against Raoul Cedras's government in Haiti (Watson Institute for International Studies, 2004, p.13). Yet, targeted penalties have been panned due to their inconsistent application and difficulties in pinpointing the particular individuals who are the targets of the limitations. The United States has mobilized corporations and institutions against Russia in what has been essentially a comprehensive way on several occasions, with the most prominent instances being the crisis in Haiti in 1994 and the current targeted sanctions on Russia. Since no further penalties were enacted by the UN Security Council due to Russia's veto, the current round of sanctions on Russia cannot be considered comprehensive.

Theoretical framework

The collective security theory has been widely lauded for its potential to keep the world stable by providing a framework for collaboration in the face of challenges to the current political order (Palmer & Perkins, 2004). Unfortunately, contrary to popular belief, group efforts do not ensure everyone's safety. In contrast to the "collective action" of a loose confederation of nations, "collective security" requires the concerted effort of the majority of governments in the globe, including all or almost all of the major powers. According to Palmer and Perkins (2004), invoking the principle of collective security when violence occurs is essential if the idea of collective security is to succeed. By embracing this idea, states commit to making the maintenance of international stability a top priority and to being ready to act together in the face of aggression or threats to any nation or the international community at large. This entails being prepared to resort to sanctions when necessary, even if doing so may potentially spark armed conflict (Palmer and Perkins, 2004).

Like its predecessor, the League of Nations, the United Nations is a collective security organisation, although it was founded to fix fundamental problems with the League's design. In contrast to the league, the United Nations welcomes members from any and all countries. All 15 members of the UN Security Council need to agree for a decision to be made, although just the five permanent members need to vote in favour. As opposed to its predecessor, the League, the United Nations may assure compliance with only the consent of its permanent members. To date, the Collective Security principle has only been successfully implemented twice: once in 1950 against North Korea (especially because the Soviet Union boycotted the Security Council session) and once in 1990 during operation desert storm, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and declared Kuwait to be its 19th province and a target of a bombardment that lasted for one thousand hours. In retrospect, Russia didn't put up much of a fight because it happened during a time when the Soviet Union openly sought to align itself with the West. As the primary body charged with maintaining world peace and security, the United Nations Security Council's unanimous backing of the sanctions regime against Iraq was essential to their effective implementation.

The collective security principle has been criticized for a number of shortcomings, especially in light of two nightmare scenarios for order-based collective security. It is possible, according to the "laws of history," that the primary collective security organization will be toppled by dissidents who resent the group's dominant position, or that the organization may disintegrate after it reaches global or regional hegemony (Watson, 1992). The collective security idea failed to function well, for instance, in Kosovo in 1999, when both Russia and China used their veto powers. Humanitarian intervention was NATO's stated justification, but some argue that the UN Security Council didn't have the power to act since it wasn't made up of liberal democratic states (Mihalka, 2021). An intervention by Russia and China in Serbia's internal affairs would cast a poor light on their own countries, which was the fundamental rationale for their opposition (Russia in Chechnya and China in Tibet). While it's true that the collective security concept encourages mutually reinforcing approaches to safety, it may become risky when the security interests of one country are irreconcilable with those of another. Russia's veto of penalties for her invasion of Ukraine raises the question of the continued relevance of collective security in the modern world. The collective security idea has been employed without a consensus at the United Nations in a variety of settings, notwithstanding the ineffectiveness of regional institutions like NATO and the EU's sanctions against Russia. It tried to reach an agreement with Russia on Kosovo and Bosnia in 1999, for example. Russia participated in both peace efforts despite receiving no financial support from the United Nations (Mihalka, 2021). This is so despite the fact that most nations only send soldiers to UN peacekeeping missions because they desperately need the cash.

Ultimately, security groups can effectively counteract external threats. As was previously said, however, world powers outside of such groups cannot avoid the temptation to undermine their acts by exercising their veto in the UN Security Council, albeit still facing sanctions from the powerful collective security organizations and its supporters. Our research is grounded in the U.S. military engagement in Ukraine and the sanction regime in place against Russia since 2014 in response to the annexation of Crimea. There may be loopholes, legitimate concerns, and busters in these punishments. The United Nations is the primary international body whose collective security system is consistent with the use of sanctions to protect global peace, which is vital to keep in mind while looking at the

Russian sanctions regime. The members of the organization have delegated to the Security Council the responsibility of ensuring international peace and security (Article 24, UN Charter). The United Nations use the leeway provided by this Article when imposing sanctions. We then examine how much leeway the United Nations, the United States, and her Western allies have under the collective security framework to ensure that the sanctions on Russia are legal, ethical, and backed by the international community.

Impact of Targeted Sanctions on Russia: A Perspective Analysis

The United Nations' involvement in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has mostly taken the shape of a deterrence strategy, with the UN sending military personnel to important NATO member states that share borders with Russia in Eastern Europe and putting economic sanctions on the country. Nonetheless, this study centers on the significance of sanction with an eye toward proving the legitimacy and effectiveness of consequence in a setting that serves to alleviate the problem. As a result of Russia's annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol in March 2014 (European Commission, 2022) the European Union has taken a number of punitive measures, including sanctions, against Russia. As a result of Russia's recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, which are not under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian government, these measures have been increased. To weaken Russia's economic base, cut off access to crucial markets and technologies, and severely constrain the country's military power, sanctions have been imposed on critical individuals and organizations. While the EU's use of these tools is entirely within its diplomatic purview, the United States has responded strongly by pursuing a number of actions, including punishing government officials, private persons with ties to the government, and companies. To provide just one example, Putin's \$630 billion war budget is presently unavailable to the Russian Central Bank since Russia's leading banks were among those that cut links with the international financial system known as SWIFT (Biden, 2002). To provide the impression that the punishment system is broad, the United States has mobilized all of its NATO allies in Europe to shut off Russia's access to global markets. As a result, the world's largest bank, Sberbank, and the world's largest private bank, Alfa Bank, have been struck with severe sanctions, and Russia's access to the international financial system has been severely limited (The White House, 2022). The organizations, governments, and institutions that have helped establish the current system of punishment are detailed in the table below.

Table 1: Targeted Sanctions On Russia

Sanctioning country/unio n	Nature and target	Corporate organizatios	Nature and target	Corporate organizatios	Nature and target
United states	Russian banks, tax service, oligarchs, lawmakers, military, oil imports, russian central bank, airlines	Intel	Technology	Volkswagen	Automaker
Japan	Russian companies, banks	Kinross gold	Energya (gold mining)	American express	Finance

	military, oligarchs, belarusian companies, russian central bank				
UK	Russian media, russian central bank, oligarchs, airlines, oil imports	Danfoss	Economy	Mercedes-benz	Automaker
Switzerland	Energy, russian tech. Companies, military, russian central bank	Hexagon	Technology	Toyota	Automaker
Finland	Consumer, logistics	Euronav	Technology	Airbus	Aviation
Australia	Oligarchs	Rabobank	Finance	Mashreqbank	Finance
New Zealand	Military, finance institutions, russian ships	Decathlon	Sports	Ing groen nv	Finance
S.Korea	Military, russian companies	Johnson & Johnson	Consumer products	Exxon mobil	Energy(oil&gas)
Iceland	Russian companies	Heineken	Breweries	Siemens energy ag	Energy(oil&gas)
Bahamas	Russian oligarchs	Carlsberg	Consumer products	Alphabet	Technology
Canada	Oligarchs, russian oil companies	Spotify technology	Media	Canada goose	Consumer goods
Germany	Military, russian companies	Nestle	Consumer products	Visa	Finance
Italy	Russian oligarchs	Enbw	Energy(oil&gas)	Mastercard	Finance
France	Military, russian companies	Renault	Automaker	Boeing	Aviation/technology
Singapore	Russian companies, military, banks,	Eneos	Energy(oil&gas)	Jaguar land rover	Automaker
Norway	Russian companies, finance institution	Bnp paribas		Harley-davidson	Automaker
Taiwan	Russian technology	Weatherford	Energy(oil&gas)	Ford	Automaker
European Union	Energy, russian finance institutions, and central bank, military, russian oligarchs, russian ships, media, airlines, lawmakers	Baker hughes	Energy(oil&gas)	Bmw	Automaker
International chess federation	Ban from hosting and participating in chess sports events	Diamond league	Sports	Nordia asset management	Finance

UEFA	Ban from hosting/participating in all european football games	Schlumberger	Energy(oil&gas)	Total energies	Energy(oil&gas)
FIFA	Ban from all fifa events	Halliburton	Energy(oil&gas)	United parcel	Logistics
Some sanctioned individuals by the u.s, eu and the uk Members of the russian defence sanction by the u.s Aleksy krivoruchko Timor ivanov Yunus-bek evkurov Dmitry bulgakov Yuriy sadovenko Nikolay pankov Ruslan tsalikov Gennady zhdko Viktor zolotov Dmitry shugaev Alexander mikheev By the uk: Roman abromovich Deniss bortnikov Oleg derpaska Peter fradkor Elena georgieva Andrey kostin Dmitri lebdev Alexei millei Boris rotenberg Igor sechim Kirill shamalor Igor shuvalor Yuri slyusar Gennady timchenko Nikolai tolnev Alisher usmanov Vladimirovna tikhonova(putin) Maria vladimirovna vorontsova (putin) Others by the us: Vladimir bogdanov Sergei chemezo Sergei ivanov Suleiman kerinov Vladimir kiriyenko Andrey patrushev Yergeny prigozhin Andrey puchkov Arkady rotenberg By the e.u: Peter aven Mikhail fridman		Radisson hotel group	Hospitality industry	Apple	Technology
		Merk	Consumer products	Nokia	Technology
		Rwe	Energy(oil&gas)	Daimler truck	Automaker
		Unicredit	Finance	General motors	Automaker
		Eli-lily	Consumer products	Ab volvo	Automaker
		Novartis	Consumer products	Aeracp holdings	Aviations
		Abbvie	Consumer products	Hsbc	Finance
		Publicis	Media	Volvo cars	Automakers
		Imperial brands	Consumer goods	Bp	Energy(oil & gas)
		Allianz	Finance	Equinor	Energy(oil & gas)
		Swiss re	Finance		
		Citi-group	Finance		
		Moneygram	Finance		
		British-american tobacco	Consumer goods		
		A.p. Moller maersk	Logistics		
		Rio tinto	Energy(oil&gas)		
		Starbucks	Consumer goods		
		Yum brands	Consumer goods		
		Macdonalds	Consumer goods		
		Shell	Energy(oil&gas)		
		Ferrari	Auto&consumer goods		
		Continental	Automakers		
		Boeing	Manufacturers		
		P&g	Consumer goods		
		Kpmg	Finance		
		Tik tok	Technology		
		Netflix	Technology		
		Danone	Consumer goods		

Dmitry grigorenko	Inditex	Consumer goods
Vladimir kiriyenko		
Dmitry konor andrey guvyev	Samsung	Technology
Kostantin knyrik	Microsoft	Technology
Modest kolerov	Airbnb	Consumer goods
Sergev kuikov		
Dmitry mazepin	Julius bar	Oligarhs
Andrey melnichenko	Ipc	Sports
Alexei mordashov	Formula one	Sports
Vadim moschkovich	Nike	Consumer products
Mikhail osersky		
Mikhail polboyarinov		
Ivan sechin		
Andrei skoch yuri soloview		
Alexander aleksadrovich vidyakhin		
Viktor vekselberg		
Alexander ponomarenko		
Violetta prigozhina		
Lyubor prgozhina		
Dmitry pumpyansky		
Galina pumpyansky		
Maxim reshetnikov		
Sergei roldugim		

Author's compilation (2022). Sources: CNBC (2022); Guardian (2022); The White House (2022); U.S Department of State (2022); Funakoshi, Lawson, & Deka (2022)

Despite the initial wave of sanctions put on Russia after the invasion of Crimea, Russia continued to attempt to take the Dombas region and Luhansk of Ukraine via special military operations. We are interested in learning if the punishments had any noticeable impact. If they were so strong, they should have been able to prevent Russia's invasion of Ukraine. How did they manage to save up enough money to invade Ukraine in such a large scale? Though the targeted sanctions appear to be working, it seems some busters and loopholes remain. There is a limit to how much energy Washington can shut off from Russia without significant consequences, as Russia is a leading oil and gas producer and supplier. Furthermore, Russia is the principal supplier of Energy (oil and gas) to the great majority of European states (Asford, 2022). Energy imports from Russia are crucial for several European nations, including North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Finland, Latvia, Germany, Bulgaria, Italy, Poland, France, the Netherlands, and Romania. It is difficult to completely implement some of the economic sanctions on them because of the close energy links that most of these countries have with the West. The BRICS initiative, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, is another important endeavor in which it participates. As a result, Russians have been rallied to support Russia's aggressiveness in the area, or to take a neutral posture. These busters are enabled by the legal basis upon which the sanctions regime based. The United Nations and its Security Council, the key collective security institution that may mobilize its members for a comprehensive measure against Russia, are divided on the issue. Russia used its veto authority to prevent the Security Council resolution criticizing Russia's effort to annex four

areas of Ukraine from passing, and China, Brazil, India, and Gabon all abstained from voting. However, 10 of the fifteen members voted in favor of the resolution (United Nations, 2022). The plan sought to undo Putin's decision to use force to split off the Ukrainian regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya from the rest of the nation. It cannot be emphasized how much the veto allowed countries who disobey sanctions to aid and abet Russia in trade on products that were subject to sanctions. The United States has nonetheless engaged in extensive diplomatic maneuvering to ensure that Western sanctions remain effective, particularly in the aftermath of the military incursion in Ukraine. Russia may have reached a different conclusion about the sanctions the West was going to implement if it had understood the entire nature of those restrictions. Sanctions imposed on Russia's economy after its annexation of Crimea and subsequent military action in Ukraine have had a major impact, as seen in the table above.

As a first step, the favorable foreign credits drastically decreased once 2014's financial limitations were put into place. The amount of foreign loans Russia received fell from 2013 (before sanctions) to 2020 (estimated) to \$470 billion. Russia turned down a loan line worth around a third of its current gross domestic product, or \$479 billion (Aslund & Snegovaya, 2021). Foreign direct investment (FDI) suffered severely as a result of the sanctions, falling from an average of 3.05% of GDP in the years before the sanctions were enacted to an all-time low of 1.39% in the years after. The restrictions implemented prior to the COVID outbreak cost Russia an additional \$169 billion between 2014 and 2020, and the situation has only worsened when a second wave of sanctions was triggered in 2022 with the commencement of Putin's military actions in Ukraine (Aslund & Snegovaya, 2021). Because of the slew of targeted sanctions aimed at significant oligarchs and business groups, the rate of fixed investments has dropped dramatically, as opposed to the annual growth rate of 62% seen during 2010-2013. Every year on average between 2014 and 2020, fixed investment in Russia declined by 0.5%. Russia's GDP decreased from about \$2.3 trillion in 2013 to \$1.5 trillion in 2020 as a direct result of the sanctions, the worst performance drop since the sanctions were introduced in 2022. For example, (Aslund & Snegovaya, 2021). Russia, although feeling the full force of the sanctions, has maintained a number of offensives. Their lackeys have helped them circumvent most Western sanctions, which have had a disastrous effect on the economies of the sanctioning states. The variety of sanctions and measures is already having a devastating effect on the Russian economy, bringing into sharp relief the fact that the brunt of the suffering will be borne by those who are not directly responsible for state policy, while the targets of the sanctions receive largely insulated protection from their effects. There is a significant tendency to erode the basic rights of the general public, as we learn from the Iraqi sanctions event, and the damage and fatalities reported by civilian populations are more horrific than the tragedy of war itself. After the Security Council imposed severe sanctions on Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait, a cholera outbreak broke out, killing hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children. Russia's sanctions are worldwide and unilateral, which is alarming since it widens the scope of the targeted penalties to encompass new aspects, but their impact on the humanitarian front has not yet been fully realised. This is a potential disaster that has not yet taken place.

Conclusion and Way forward

The purpose of this study was to provide a comprehensive overview of Russia's sanctions policy and its historical context. As international tensions rise and other developing economic blocs, such as the BRICS states, advocate for a shift, we are more able to see the difficulty of enacting a legally binding sanctions regime. We looked at the complicated nature of the Russia sanctions, and we understand that their borders are unclear. When the West provides extensive support and mobilization to ensure that the sanctions are effective, it is inaccurate to call them comprehensive. Sanctions in this situation might be thought of as targeted. The reason for this is that unlike Iraq, which suffered the full force of United Nations sanctions, there was no legal basis for applying such penalties on Iran.

In light of our findings, we think it's crucial to stress that the harshness of sanctions matters for their deterrent effectiveness. While we agree that the safeguards afforded by international law to civilian populations are vital, we also feel that sanctions that do not directly impact civilians are unlikely to inspire internal resistance to the government (Smith, 2004). It appears that the choice to impose tailored sanctions against Russia was a good one, since the country has been able to exert the same level of pressure as would be feasible with broader penalties. Despite the claims that sanctions are just "soft diplomacy" that doesn't work, there are clear indications that they aren't. We do not believe that a nuclear war is likely under the current global circumstances. Sanctioning Russia is better to the alternative of risking a world in which national sovereignty is transgressed at will, and while the sanctions may not have deterred Russia enough to prevent her from continuing the conflict, they will have an impact on the U.S. economy and its allies. It's critical to speak out against the growing acceptance of state-level rule breaking in the international community. China and other recalcitrant actors in the international system are deterred from launching an aggressive military invasion of Taiwan by the effective enforcement of the sanction regime in Russia.

Finally, we propose a change to the United Nations' system for applying sanctions in the hopes that a more democratic United Nations Security Council, with less emphasis on veto, might serve as a model for a reasonable and comprehensive international order. Since "if the Security Council is to acquire the requisite respect in the international system it is imperative that its most significant and influential judgements, those with large-scale life-and-death consequences, be better made, more justified, and better conveyed," this is of paramount importance. The collective security of the United Nations should not prevent it from addressing individual risks inside the international system, especially when doing so would increase the organization's responsiveness, credibility, resilience, and overall quality of service.

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