INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN ADDIS ABABA: EXTENT, CHALLENGES AND MEASURES TAKEN

Jemal ABAGISSA
Addis Ababa University
Department of Public Administration and Development Management
jemal.abagissa@aau.edu.et

Abstract: Addis Ababa has experienced a rapid rate of physical expansion. This trend is partly influenced by spontaneous growth, which has resulted in the emergence and development of squatter settlements. As new houses are being built in the existing squatter settlements and unoccupied areas, the number and size of illegal settlements in Addis Ababa has been increasing over time. The purpose of this paper is to assess the extent of squatter settlements, its challenges and the measures taken to mitigate the problem. In order to achieve the objective of this study, secondary data sources were mainly used to analyze the subject. The findings indicate that though the city administration attempted to prevent the construction of illegal settlements by issuing various regulations, the proliferation of illegal settlements has continued unabated. Thus, demolitions had taken place in parts of the city where preventive measures failed. Both in the implementations of the regulations and demolitions, the city administration faced many problems such as high temptation for illegal construction, population pressure, weak law enforcement and inefficient institutions. The success of squatting tempts more squatting. When squatting exists widely, orderly development and expansion are hindered.

Keywords: squatter settlement, informal settlement, regularization, demolition


1. INTRODUCTION

The primary negative impact of urbanization is the fast spread of urban areas into agricultural and woodland areas, often informally. Developing countries have faced enormous population movements from rural to major urban centers and this led to swelling informal settlements posing city’s socio-economic challenges (Nouri A. Elfarnouk, 2015). Therefore, one of the perplexing problems confronting many of the developing nations today is the illegal occupation of urban land. This is generally known by the term "squatting." Its most frequent causes are the high increase in national population, the surge of people toward the cities, and the incapacity of the affected nations to meet the needs of urban growth by providing the land and housing needed to accommodate newcomers.

The UNCHS (2003) estimated that between 40 and 70% of urban growth in developing countries is "informal". This figure is similar in Addis Ababa City with the housing stock located in unplanned areas or informal settlements (ORAAMP, 2001). In
some places, such settlements have been formed through large, organized invasions of public land.

There are different colloquial names for such settlements in different countries: the Bidonville of the French colonies, the Gecekondu of Turkey, the Barriadas of Lima, Barong-Barongs of the Philippines, Favelas of Rio, Callampas of Chile, Ranchos of Venezuela, Villas Miserias of Buenos Aires and the Colonias Populares of Mexico (Peattie and Haas, 1981).

The issue of urban informal settlements, as observed in most urban centers of Africa, Asia, and Latin America is broad, complex and dynamic, it arises from the different views and policies observed differently in different countries. Hence, the control and management of these settlements also vary. Much of the complexity around informal settlement has been arising from perception differences. These include the difference observed in defining, identifying the causes and effects and in taking measures so as to alleviate the problem.

Informal urbanization trends in sub-Saharan Africa shows Tanzania to be one of the countries with highest population living in informal settlements followed by Mozambique and Ethiopia (Shubira Kalugila, 2013).

In the Ethiopian context these types of settlements are known as "Chereka Bet". The term Chereka bet in its literal translation means "house of the moon" implying the illegal construction of houses is done at nights. The settlements are built without the consent of city governments and without having construction permit given by city governments. In Ethiopia, different cities have responded differently to these settlements. In Addis Ababa (Bole, Yeka and Kolfe sub-cities) there were demolitions in 1994, which destroyed 13,440 informally constructed houses (Gondo, 2011); (Daniel, 2011). In Adama, over 3,751 structures constructed without official municipal permits were demolished over a five-year period, although the demolished structures were soon replaced by fresh ones. In Bahir Dar, eviction through demolition took place in 1995 in Kebeles 11 and 13. In Ambo, the municipality applied litigation, whereby 412 land related cases were filed in courts during the periods August 1/1997 to May 10/2000EC.

As being the capital city of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa accounts for about one fourth of the country’s urban population. Because of high population concentration in the city, it is experiencing multiple challenges, one of which is the slow provision of houses for its residents which led to high gap between housing supply and demand encouraging the proliferation of squatter settlements.

Menwuyelet Melesse (2005) stated that squatter settlements in Addis Ababa emerged as a result of many factors, such as the delay of the implementation of legal housing, delays of providing legal land provisions, and increases of the cost of housing rent in the urban areas. He also said that beside those economic factors, there are political and legal failures that represent the absence of government actions to control and arrange open spaces, the lack of code enforcement service to regulate and control the appearance of illegal house construction, the absence of inclusive legal responses towards the continuous appearance of the squatting phenomenon, and the lack of controlling and legalizing the practice of making profits from land sale by land speculators.
1.1. The Objectives of the Research

The general objective of the study is to examine the extent of squatter settlement, the challenges and measures taken by the city administration in a bid to minimize the proliferation of squatter settlements. Contribution to knowledge by unveiling the forces and factors contributing the rise of informal settlements, the government interventions and their outcomes in the city of Addis Ababa are the intentions of this study.

1.2 Research questions

The study attempts to answer the questions on the extent of informal settlement in Addis Ababa; the challenges encountered in the implementation of the measures and the measures taken to control the settlements.

1.3. The Description of the Study Area

This study is conducted in Addis Ababa, the capital city of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The total population of the city is estimated to be 3,048,631 as of 2012 (A.A BoFED, 2011/12). Addis Ababa is not only the largest city in Ethiopia but also a textbook example of a primate city, as it is at least 14 times as large as Dire Dawa, the second largest city in the country. As a result Addis Ababa’s share of the total urban population was 23.8 percent in 2007 (CSA 2007).

It is worth highlighting that the greater part of this growth is due more to net immigration (1.69 percent per annum) than to natural increase (1.21 percent per annum). Administratively, the city is a chartered city having three layers of government: city government, sub-city administrations, and district (Woreda) administrations.

Table 1 The sub-cities, their population size and areas in sq km

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-city</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area in Sq. Km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AkakiKaliti</td>
<td>205,385</td>
<td>118.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nifas silk lafto</td>
<td>358,359</td>
<td>68.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KolfeKeranio</td>
<td>485,952</td>
<td>61.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulele</td>
<td>303,226</td>
<td>30.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lideta</td>
<td>228,547</td>
<td>9.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkos</td>
<td>250,665</td>
<td>14.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arada</td>
<td>239,638</td>
<td>9.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis ketema</td>
<td>289,344</td>
<td>7.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeka</td>
<td>392,781</td>
<td>85.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bole</td>
<td>350,102</td>
<td>122.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2013 CSA projection

In terms of area coverage Bole is the largest sub-city followed by Akaki-Kality and Yeka. Addis ketema is the smallest and followed by Lideta and Arada Sub-cities. The two largest sub cities are found in the expansion areas of the city with rising squatter settlements. The sub-cities are also divided in two weredas, which are the smallest administrative unit in the city. There are 116 weredas in the city administration.
Figure 1 The Map of Addis Ababa indicating sub-cities and woredas

Source: AADIPO

1.4. Data Source

The data are collected from secondary sources. These include sources from Addis Ababa City Administration and various published and unpublished documents obtained from different sources. In addition to this, existing directives, regulations and reports on the situations of informal settlement are reviewed and analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively to answer the research questions. Literature and theories related to the research topic, such as, issues of informality as well as government intervention in the phenomenon were reviewed.

1.5. The scope and limitations of the study

The study is mainly confined to the review of the implementation of the two regulations adopted in 2000 and 2010 for controlling squatter settlements in Addis Ababa City. Eliminating informality requires two types of interventions. One is to prevent the establishment of new informal settlements using different preventive approaches. The second is curative approach including legal measures against the illegal squatters. Though the study intends to examine the implementation of the regulations as preventive tool, it also examines the curative measures that have taken in cases where the preventive approaches failed. This study relies on secondary data due to the difficulty in generating primary sources on illegal settlements. Generating primary data requires locating squatters who are scattered across most sub cities which is not feasible for small scale research. Moreover, the problem of using secondary sources is that some of them are not of the recent time.
The researcher reviewed various secondary sources and used to answer the research questions. The secondary sources were carefully selected and reviewed in line with the subject under study which is different from previous studies in terms of addressing three interrelated issues: extent, challenges and measures regarding squatter settlements in Addis Ababa.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Over the years a number of policies have been put forward to address the social, economic and physical situations of informal settlements and their residents in developing countries. Studies have been conducted also on the definition, nature and characteristics of the informal settlements in urban centers of developing countries.

2.1 Understanding Squatter Settlements

A marked phenomenon of rapid urbanization in Africa has been the proliferation and uncontrolled spread of so-called spontaneous or "informal settlements built by immigrants to meet their shelter needs. Known as informal because they are built outside the legal planning framework, informal settlements are generally characterized by their physical and social conditions. As informal settlements began to proliferate in African cities, the initial reaction of most governments to in-migration and spontaneous settlements was relatively uniform: increased regulation and enforcement (Payne, 1989). Informal settlements were seen strictly as slums - places of poverty, disease, and criminality. They were an affront to the modernization orientation of African governments who desired properly planned and developed cities. Informal settlements threatened property values of formally developed neighborhoods and commercial investments. As such, governments strove to enforce planning regulations, public health acts, and building codes to protect the formally developed areas of their cities. They attempted to discourage in-migration and the growth of informal settlements through demolition policies and campaigns of persuasion (Kubale Palmer and Patton, 1988). In the 1970s in Nairobi, Kenya, for instance, the government conducted a campaign called Turudimashambani ("Let's return to the rural areas") while implementing an official policy of slum clearance (Macharia 1992).

In the 1970s, a shift in attitudes toward informal settlements began to occur. Rather than being seen as eyesores, health hazards, or havens for criminals, the self-built structures of informal settlements were recognized as essentially proactive responses to a situation of acute housing scarcity. Planners began to recognize informal settlement residents as industrious self-builders who needed only limited assistance from the state - mainly in the form of secure tenure and basic urban services - in order to improve their circumstances themselves.

2.2. Definition of informal settlements

A clear definition of informal settlement is hardly available. Various words have been used in literature to refer to squatter settlements. These include spontaneous, irregular, unplanned, marginal and informal settlements. There are many definitions of
“informal settlements”. The terms have been used to refer to unregulated, illegal and unauthorized construction, arising from the conditions and regulations in different countries, including “spontaneous”, “unplanned”, “unauthorized”, “illegal” or “squatter” settlements. The United Nations has used the term “informal settlements” to refer to:

i) residential areas where a group of housing units has been built on land to which the occupants have no legal claim, or which they occupy illegally;

ii) unplanned settlements where housing is not in compliance with current planning and building regulations (authorized housing)(United Nations,2015).

Daniel, (2013) defined, informal settlements as dense settlements comprising communities housed in self-constructed shelters under conditions of informal or traditional land tenure. They are common features in developing countries and are typically the product of an urgent need for shelter by the urban poor. As such they are characterized by a dense proliferation of small, makeshift shelters built from diverse materials, degradation of the local ecosystem and by severe social problems.

Furthermore, in Vienna Declaration (2004) cited in Bogdan and Daniel, (2013), informal settlements are defined as: human settlements, which for a variety of reasons do not meet requirements for legal recognition (and have been constructed without respecting formal procedures of legal ownership, transfer of ownership, as well as construction and urban planning regulations), exist in their respective countries and hamper economic development. While there is significant regional diversity in terms of their manifestation, these settlements are mainly characterized by informal or insecure land tenure, inadequate access to basic services, both social and physical infrastructure and housing finance.

The term squatter settlement, if not defined precisely, can lead to a misunderstanding of the term slum. In fact many writers often use the terms interchangeably. Slums however, are often considered a legally allowed settlements of an urban area but are also overcrowded, with poor living conditions and older houses compared to other parts of the city, and inadequate services (UNCHS, Habitat: 1982).

In the Ethiopian context, the Addis Ababa Development and Improvement Project office (AADIPO, 2003) adopts the following working definition for informal settlement. Informality/illegality includes any form of construction (such as houses, fence, notice board, sewerage lines, containers, temporary/movable kiosks, etc...) which have been erected or built on public lands without having legal basis. Furthermore, it also includes any unauthorized expansion/ encroachment made on public rental houses. However, the degree of informality/illegality varies: some can be totally informal where as others can only be partially informal. Based on this working definition, therefore, the whole forms of informality is divided in to two major groups: Group 1: includes those informal settlements which have been occupied and built without having any legal bases or evidence accepted by the law (such as title deed/ book and building permit). These settlements are commonly called as "squatter settlements” and mainly found at the expansion areas of a city. Group 2: includes settlements which are partially illegal/ informal. The illegality comes from so many sources. For example, they can have legal right (title deed/ book) but not building permit or having both the title deed/book and building permit but built, expand, upgrade, change the shape and size etc. without the
proper legal procedures/permit. Such settlements are mainly found in the inner part of a city (As AADIPO 2003 cited in Daniel, 2011:6-7).

This paper will utilize the definitions given by the Addis Ababa Development and Improvement Project office referring to group 1 type settlements as it is the most prevalent type of informality.

2.3. Characteristics of Squatter Settlements

From the definition, the characteristics of informal settlements are evident. Sirgut Gezahengn (2013), argued that squatter settlements are characterized by the following three interrelated and essential traits. The characteristics include:

**Physical aspects**: Squatter settlements have infrastructure and service below minimum level. They may not be connected to water supply, electricity, road, and drainage and sewerage facilities. Insecured because of lack of security services like police service, fire protection service. The squatter settlements are also built in marginal lands at peripheries, river sides and dumpsites. The key characteristic that delineates a squatter settlement is its lack of ownership of the land parcel on which they have built their house. These could be vacant government or public land, or marginal land parcels like railway setbacks or "undesirable" marshy lands.

**Social aspects**: Squatter settlements belong to low income groups or informal workers. On average most residents earn a very low income and many of them are part-time workers/daily laborers. Most squatters are predominantly migrants from rural to urban or urban to rural and they may be also second or third generations of squatters.

**Legal aspects**: Squatter settlements are inherently illegal because the squatters occupy public land without any legal permission. They do not have authorized permits, ownership certificate and hence not backed by legal provisions.

Moreover, the study conducted in Kenya identified that the common characteristics shared by all informal settlements are (1) insecurity of tenure, (2) lack of planning, (3) lack of infrastructure (e.g. roads, water pipes, drainage systems, toilets, waste collection, electricity), (4) poor environmental condition, (5) lack of public facilities (schools, dispensaries), and (6) unemployment and poverty (Pellikka, P., J. Ylhäisi & B. Clark (eds. 2004).

2.4. Consequences of Squatter Settlements

From a broader perspective, the combined burdens of informal settlement have been fundamentally harmful to cities, to the overall urban population, and to the residents of informal settlements themselves. The implications of the phenomenon are serious and manifold in numerous ways: legal, social, environmental, political, and economic. Informal settlements in a city are causes for health problems, environmental deterioration, social distress, and urban violence. In this regard, different authors have identified different consequences of squatter settlements in different part of the world (Mostafa, 2000).

It causes social, physical, hygienic, political, security and economical harms like spread of crime and murder, drug addiction e, the spread of prostitution, the spread of alcoholic drinks. Physical harms include irregular residential structure, unorganized
facade of buildings and its undesirable effects on the appearance and the image of the cities. In developing countries squatter settlements are located at potential expansion areas of cities; hinder planned development, results in the misuse of land resource and infrastructure.

2.5. Approaches of managing squatter settlements

This section explores government attitudes, responses and policies towards squatter settlements and slums since 1950s. According to Collins Adjei Mensah (2010), there are five major chronological categories: laissez -faire attitudes in the 1950s and 1960s; site and service programs in the 1970s, slum upgrading in the 1980s, enabling strategies and security of tenure in the 1990s, and Cities without slums action plan in the 2000s. There are also two opposing actions taken in the intervention of squatter settlements namely; regularization and demolition at various times and places.

For the purpose of this study the Laissez-Faire Attitudes in the 1950s, Site and Service Programs in the 1970s and Cities Without Slums action plan in the 2000s, Regularization and Demolition are briefly discussed. In all the approaches, squatter settlements are often conceived and portrayed as institutional failures in housing policy, population pressure due to rural-urban migration and the gap between demand and supply. Thus, measures to address their existence and appearance have evolved around such thinking. As a result, various strategies were implemented to mitigate the socio-economic, physical and health wellbeing of slums and their residents.

1. Laissez-faire Attitude: 1950s-1960s

During the tolerance period in the 1950s and 1960s, urban authorities in Developing Countries turned a 'blind eye' to slum houses (Rakodi, 2001). Negligence dominated until the early 1970s when it was replaced by public housing. Informal settlements were regarded as temporary unavoidable phenomena that would pass with economic development. During this time informal settlements were not depicted on land use maps, instead there was a blank for undeveloped land (UN-HABITAT 2003). Slums were considered 'relics of traditional villages' and in the process of being absorbed by the new urban planning scheme inherited from Western societies— with little consideration of local and cultural realities (Gaskell, 1990; Njoh, 2003). The alternative was public housing schemes, where local governments provide public housing in collaboration with national governments and other stakeholders in developing countries.

However, these projects were implemented in a discriminatory fashion, largely because the 'indigenous' political rulers, who replaced the colonial power, perpetuated the existing social and class divisions as the previous 'master' (Fanon, 1963). In fact, the main beneficiaries of formal public and planned housing schemes were civil servants and middle and upper-income earners (Fekade, 2000). Moreover, nepotism, corrupt practices, poor governance and incompetence significantly and rapidly contributed to the expansion of slums, and widened the gap between those who were in positions of power or had some sort of 'connections' and the rest of the urban population.

For example, Hope (1999) reports that public housing schemes across Africa as a whole provided less than 5% of housing needs. Thus, such public housing schemes were
unable to supply sufficient dwellings. Instead, the approach marginalized the majority of urban dwellers and ignored low-income urban dwellers and rural urban migrants who settled there generating more slums. Furthermore, it is now clear that urban effort and resources directed towards providing public housing have ended up serving a small portion of urban dwellers and usually those that were largely better resourced than the majority (Ali, M.H. and Sulaiman, M.S. (2006).

2. Site and Service Scheme: 1970s

In the 1970’s, the World Bank initiated the Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading (SSU) Programme in many countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The strategy was adopted to provide planned and serviced housing land to low income people in urban areas and improve basic community infrastructure services, such as water, sanitation, roads and market facilities in informal settlements. The move emerged out of a consensus arrived at during the Habitat I conference in 1976 which included: site and services and self-help housing projects; core housing; slum and squatter settlement upgrading; the stimulation of small-scale enterprises and informal sector activities in project areas; and an attempt to expand the provision of public services (Burgess, 1997). Site and service schemes are credited with enabling shared responsibilities between slum dwellers and government. On the one hand, the program emphasized the participation and the contribution of the beneficiaries to the resettlement process. Similarly, the programs acknowledged and capitalized on the ability of low-income dwellers to mobilize informal resources. On the other hand, local governments were no longer acting as 'providers' but as 'facilitators', which saved them some resources (Pugh, 2001).

Shortfalls of the scheme included the relatively low number of beneficiaries, the lack of understanding and clarity around the role of the private sector, the lack of planning around the location of new serviced plots, low or non-existent standards, and the failure to achieve cost recovery (Pugh, 2001). For instance when assessing the number beneficiaries, Hope (1999) found that less than 6% of intended beneficiaries in Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe actually benefited from the scheme for the paradoxical reason of affordability. This was so because the transitional period between the demolition and the new establishment was not always well negotiated (lack of slum dwellers’ participation). Moreover, several evicted slum dwellers had difficulties accessing or being qualified for new serviced parcels due to lack of land titles and rights (the majority could not legally claim and prove their tenure right).

According to Peattie (1982) and Van der Linden (1992) notwithstanding the popularity of sites-and-services schemes with the World Bank and other donor agencies, the schemes have increasingly come under critical scrutiny.


The new century has called for new strategies and plan for slum. In 1999, the World Bank and the UN-Habitat initiated the Cities Without Slums (CWS) action plan, which constitutes a part of the United Nations Millennium Declaration Goals and Targets. Specifically, the action plan aims at improving the living condition of at least 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020 (UN-Habitat, 2003). The main innovation in this policy is to move from the physical eradication or upgrading of slums adopted by past policies, to start to address one of the fundamental reasons why slums exist in the
first place: poverty. The action plan recognizes that slums are largely a physical manifestation of urban poverty, and to deal with them effectively, future actions and policies should also associate urban and slum stakeholders in the poverty reduction or eradication campaign.

This extended approach of Cities Without Slums (CWS) action plan is encouraging, but raises four important concerns. Firstly, poverty is just one of the components of the incidence of slum (Shatkin, 2004). The CWS is not comprehensive enough to determine other variables that also account for slum incidence. Such variables could include (at the macro and cross-country levels) debt burden, health issues, social and political instabilities and natural disasters. Secondly, the number targeted is far too modest to significantly change the number of slum dwellers by the year 2020. In 2000, it was estimated that 850 million people live in slums and it is projected that by 2020 the number will reach 1.8 billion (UN-Habitat, 2003). Thirdly, there is no clearly defined variable to measure the 'improvement of living conditions' of 100 million slum dwellers. One can reasonably query how it will be possible to differentiate between 'improved living conditions' driven by CWS—in different cities, realities and contexts—and other city development strategies. Such uncertainty suggests that the operational and methodological components of the CWS action plan are yet to be defined or fine-tuned. Finally, the CWS action plan does not articulate what measures should be taken or formulated to curb the emergence of new slum. Similarly, there is no provision or indication as to what actions various urban stakeholders at all levels (local, national and international) should undertake to reduce, if not stop, the mushrooming of new slums. Unless these concerns are properly taken on board, the ambitious 'City Without Slums' action plan remains a slogan. Apart from those discussed above, there were also other approaches which were implemented by the authorities of urban centres at various times and places as the reactions to the proliferation of informal settlements namely; demolition and regularization.

4. Demolition

Countries may enforce land-use policies and plans by adopting strict police measures, demolitions, and an increase of penalties for illegal occupations (United Nations, 2015). Hence, demolishing indecent settlements took place in different countries. In Africa and elsewhere the implementation of the policy was the result of the then dominant design and planning paradigm of modernism whereby the master plan was the only means used to plan the city. Thus, the problem of slum growth was conceived as the lack of rationality provided by the master plan. These resolutions came in the early years of independence in most African countries and so they were embraced by politicians as one of the nation-building strategies. They were also embraced as governments’ opportunity to give the city back to its people after their long elimination and isolation from urban life during the colonial times (Hamdi (1995).

According to UN Habitat (2003), demolition did not solve the problems of slums, but instead it shifted them to the periphery of cities, to rural urban fringes, where access to land was easier and planning control non-existent. The continuing spatial growth of cities brought about an endless cycle of new evictions and the creation of new slums on the periphery of cities, outside municipal boundaries, or it accelerated the overcrowding
of dilapidated buildings within cities. Similarly, the unpromising results of demolition strategies started to open up new ways for handling the perception of slums.

5. Regularization

Formalization is frequently referred to as “legalization of informal settlements”. Formalization measures may aim to address the lack of a legal ownership title for those squatting on state-owned lands (United Nations, 2015). This is usually achieved through legalization of the informal settlement or by correcting existing planning, zoning and construction irregularities in non-permitted construction or those with violated permits.

These illegalities are usually addressed through:

- a revision of zoning and planning procedures, regulations and standards;
- a regularization and upgrade of informal settlements;
- applying controls and upgrading individual constructions in order to meet certain environment, health and safety;

Formalization projects vary according to policies adopted and priorities given by governments. For example, some countries legalize informal constructions built before a certain date, (excluding those that are built in environmentally sensitive areas) and some accompany the process with a legal reform of existing zoning and planning systems, the adoption of development monitoring procedures, or with provisions for affordable or social housing.

A shift to regularization was based on the diversity of local situations, the legal and regulatory framework, and the failure of responses based mainly on repressive options and the direct and highly subsidized provision of land and housing by the public sector for the poorest segment of the urban population. Recognition of squatter settlements also fostered increased awareness at international level of the right to housing and protection from forced eviction, and the definition of new national and local political agendas in the context of an emerging civil society, as well as the.

Kombe (2006) argues that the move to regularize, formalize and improve the property rights of the poor in informal settlements is a welcome idea. However, considering the magnitude of the problem of informal settlements and their high rate of growth and consolidation, huge financial outlays would be required to regularize them. Sliuzas (2004) as quoted by Kombe (2006: 5) sounds a warning, adding that given the extent of the informal housing sector in many cities of sub-Saharan Africa and the weak public sector, the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive upgrading approach such as regularization has also been criticized as being anti-urban, dualist and an oversimplification of the complex urban systems that exist and continually evolve.

It does not seem to address the root causes of the informal urban problem i.e. forces underpinning informal urbanization. The interventions seem not to offer solutions that can give rise to sustainable and functional urban growth, instead informal urbanization is growing day after day especially in the peri-urban areas.

Lessons from the intervention policies

The discussion on approaches for informal settlement intervention from the 1970s to 2000s found out that two main issues emerged based on the nature of their formation and implementation. First, most policies were based on a reactive approach than a proactive one. Policies were formulated to react to the problems already in place.
Second, it appears that the policies were not owned by the countries or the very people affected by the informality. The excessive involvement of external organizations and international agencies in the design and implementation of policies distanced them from the affected countries and the poor people in the slums.

The critical factors affecting the formation of informal settlements are notably related to several major interrelated challenges. Studies show that rapid urbanization and influx of people to urban area, lack of control mechanisms, inadequate formal land distribution, lack of resources, poverty and socio cultural factors are major causes of informal settlements. Similarly, inconsistent and complex legislations, unnecessary bureaucracy for land development and permission are additional factors contributing to the proliferation of informal settlements.

The review clearly shows that despite a few 'best practices' recorded in implementing informal settlement policies, settlements have continued to dominate the urban landscape of most cities in developing countries. Some of the weaknesses of past slum policies are that conditions pertaining to the incidence of slums were not taken into account. Such conditions include the negative impact of international interventions (e.g., Structural Adjustment Programs), the impacts of neoliberal policies (e.g., liberalization and globalization), urban poverty (or income gaps), poor governance, socioeconomic and political instabilities, rapid urban growth rate, inadequate planning regulations, poor housing financing (Shatkin, 2004).

3. THE EXPERIENCE OF ADDIS ABABA

The development of squatter settlements is one of the major urban problems currently facing most cities of developing countries. Like in other cities in developing countries, in Addis Ababa the development of squatter settlements has become one of the major urban planning and management impediments in the city today. To secure footholds in the city, thousands of people, in violation of law and ownership rights, have seized land and erected makeshift and dwellings. Squatter settlements are seen on hillsides, parks, roadsides, on the urban outskirts and even on valuable land in the cities' centers. In Addis Ababa, squatter settlements are commonly known in Amharic as 'Yecherka Betoch" meaning "the moon light houses"; a name given to such structures because most often than not they are constructed under the moon light and are found appearing as a mushroom would overnight. These squatter settlements are constructed in a very short period of time, in two or three nights. The squatters usually carry out the construction of their houses during the night when the kebele administrators are out of duty. And then the squatters and their families move into the shelter as soon as it takes the form of some kind of a house, which they upgrade gradually. Squatters falling under this category are people who have the capacity to construct a house if they were supplied with the required land (Tamirat. 1997: 50; Tadesse, 2000:12; Minwuyelet, 2004: 45).

According to Taye (2002), the main reasons for the proliferation of squatter settlements and unplanned expansion of the city at the peripheries of the Addis Ababa city are that peasants around the city provide urban land to individuals for housing construction without the consent of the concerned legal urban authorities. Taye also
stated that from 1982 to 1986 formal housing construction had not been carried out because during this period a new housing policy was under preparation. Hence, many urban dwellers could not tolerate and some tried to accommodate themselves through informal land acquisition. Similar situations also had occurred between 1992 and 1995. During the time when government had decided market-oriented land and housing development system, especially the land lease policy. While the policy was being prepared, land allocation for residential as well as for other developments came to a standstill due to the absence of clear housing and land development policies. As a result applications for urban land have been accumulated in the waiting lists of municipalities and offices of the Ministry of Works and Urban Development (MWUD). This situation induced or forced a significant proportion of the urban population to seek land especially in the periphery of Addis Ababa. Consequently unauthorized constructions and squatter settlements have proliferated in many parts of the surrounding areas of the city such as Bole Bulbula, Mekanisa, Keranio, and Kotebe (Taye, 2002: 37-38). Even later the proliferation of squatter settlements continued unabated.

According to the study conducted by the Urban Development and Works Bureau in the year 2000, the total area covered by squatter settlements in Addis Ababa was around 2000 hectares and about 300,000 people were living in 60,000 squatter housing units (UDWB, 2002:2 cited in Minwuyelet, 2005:4). This figure accounts for 20% of the total housing stock of the city and the total area occupied by squatter settlements was estimated at 13.6% of the total built-up area.

**Figure 2 A view of typical informal settlement**

*Source: AADIPO (2003).*
Besides, according to the report of city Administration, in 2009 there were many un-identified squatter settlements in the city occupied by the residents (Addis Ababa City Administration, 2010:19). Furthermore, according to the study conducted on the causes and consequences of squatter settlements in Yeka Sub-City, between year 2005 and 2012 more than 914 houses were built on 47,000 square meters of land (Sirgut Gezahegn, 2013). The expansion also took place to the east to Kotebe area (for residence); to the south Kalitti and Makkansisa area (dominantly planned for both residence and industry), to the West along the road to Jimma and Keraniyo (mainly for residence), and along the road to Ambo (mainly formal housing in the Ascо area). The table that follows sheds light on the extent of informal settlements in different parts of the city.

Table 2 The Location of Squatter Settlements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Woreda</th>
<th>Kebele</th>
<th>Area in hectare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kotebe (kara-Alo) along both sides of the Dessie road</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>112.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotebe</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>81.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotebe</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotebe (Yeka )</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reppi</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>138.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jimma road on the right side of the road to Sebeta</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>228.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayer Tena the settlements around the UDPO housing project</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>115.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanna Mariam along the left and right side of the ring road</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>288.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliti around the waste water treatment plant (along the river)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nefas silk WorkuSefer</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>95.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of WorkuSefer</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of WorkuSefer (Adjacent to Bole Bulbula)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gourd Shola (south of transport ministry workers residence)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>81.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC (North of the special housing project )</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>350.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meri(south and northern part of the road to Ayat)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>90.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ORAAMP 2001, in AR, 2002: 4

3.1. Modalities of access to land in informal settlements

In most cities in the developing world a multiplicity of land delivery mechanism exists, which has not generally been acknowledged by government. In Addis Ababa, data show that land is acquired illegally in addition to direct occupation. This includes purchase from farmers and from established informal settlers. This modality is mainly facilitated by illegal brokers and speculators.

Table 3 Sample Illegal Land Acquisition in Kolfe-Keraniyo sub-city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquisition forms</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought from farmers*</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought from informal sub-dividers</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brought from informal settlers</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought from vendors</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Kolfe Keranyo Sub-city, 2010

*Peasant associations and individual farmers around the city provide urban land to individuals for housing construction without the consent of the concerned legal urban authorities.

One can understand from the preceding data that informal settlements have continued to grow and expand throughout the city particularly in the sub cities located in expansion areas. Most of these settlements are believed to have been built in violation of the city’s master plan. Was the city administration aware of this phenomenon? If so, what measures have been taken so far? The sections that follow will address these questions.

### 3.2 The Implementation of Regulations in Controlling Squatter Settlements in Addis Ababa

Saying these much about the prevalence and expansion of squatter settlement in the city of Addis Ababa, let us now look at the legal frameworks adopted by the city government at different times (Regulation No. 1 of 2000 and Regulation No. 2 of 2010) in order to control and prevent the expansion of squatter settlement in the city. As indicated in the literature above, two basic approaches are of relevance in this case, preventive and curative measures. Preventive measures are taken to prevent the emergence of squatter settlements. On the other hand where the squatter settlement had evolved with its attendant problems, appropriate curative measures are undertaken. To this effect Regulation No.1 of 2000, Regulation No.2 of 2010 and Directive No.17 of 2014 were promulgated by the City Government. These regulations stressed that squatter settlements affect the growth and development of Addis Ababa and have diverse effects up on the growth of the city in general and master plan of the city, squatters, and residents of the city in particular. Directive No.17 of 2014 is implemented only for almost half a year. Hence, it could be too early to make the review of the implementation of this directive. Therefore, the scope of this paper is limited to the review of the two earlier regulations focusing on their achievements and challenges.

#### 3.2.1. Regulation Number 1 of 2000

Regulation number 1 of 2000 was the first regulation adopted by the then municipal Administration of Addis Ababa in 2000. As it is indicated in the Regulation’s preamble the primary purpose of enacting such regulation was to build efficient land utilization in the city by controlling informal settlements. In the preamble, it states that:

"...አዲስአበባስታገርገርአስተዳደርበተሸሇናቀልተገረጢ፡፡በዚህመሰረትመመሪያውከወጣበትቀንጀምሮወደሙሇትግበራበመግባትከግንቦት1988ተይዞታናአስተዳደርበተሸሇናቀልተገረጢ..." (Addis Ababa City Administration, 2010:1)
Its English version can read as "...to provide proper and better service delivery in the land tenure and its administration in Addis Ababa City, to manage the scarce land resource utilization and to prevent illegal settlements, the City Administration has given due attention and enacted Regulation No. 1 of 2000. Based on this, the implementation of the regulation should be made to treat all lands and houses occupied through different means and which do not have any legal ownership and title deeds with the provision of title deed certificates.

Moreover, the regulation states that all illegal and squatter settlements which are occupied after the Proclamation No. 47/67 should be treated in two ways. First, those lands and houses occupied up to 1996 can be legalized if they are found in compliance with the master plan provided that they fulfill some conditions indicated in the law. The next paragraph is an explanatory of this intent. Those illegal holdings serving for residential purpose and in conformity with urban development plan and for the unauthorized holder who fulfills other criteria mentioned in the regulation shall be regularized for once according to the minimum plot size standard of the City by entering in to the lease system within four years’ time starting from the date on which the regulation came in to force.

Despite the regulation, illegal settlements have flourished in the city from time to time because of failure to implement law and order and abstentions from taking action after illegal residences are built. Abstention from taking action against illegal settlers refers to a situation where the concerned bodies consciously or unconsciously ignore the problems of informality either due to lack of capacity to tackle the problem or failure to recognize the existence of the problem in terms of its scale, intensity and severity.

Another major problem is the misinterpretation and misunderstanding by the residents of Regulation No. 1. The true intention of the Regulation was to minimize illegal settlements by legalizing all residential houses built between 1975 and 1996 if they fulfill minimum requirements such as alignment with master plan and plot size not more than 175 square meters. The residents interpreted it to mean that all squatter housing units will be given legal status and recognition by the city government. Thus the issuance of the regulation has contributed to the emergence of new waves of squatter houses instead of curbing it. For instance 400 squatter housing units were constructed around Bole Secondary High School in a very short period of time following the issuance of the regulation (ORRAMP, 2001 quoted in Minwuyelet Melese 2005:23). According to this study, 59.1% of the respondents in another sub-city called Kolfe Keranyo have built their houses after the issuance of the Regulation.

Consequently, the problem has contributed to the unplanned and horizontal expansion of the built-up area resulting in increased costs in terms of infrastructure and basic urban service provisions. This prompted the issuance of another regulation called Regulation No. 2, 2010.

3.2.2 Regulation Number 2 of 2010

As to the preamble of the regulation, the objectives of the regulation are stated in the following way;"...ወመመሪያውር2/2002ወምመሰረትይአሆንስንገቃቸውንእናበአዋጁበማሻሻልናሌሎችአንቀጾችንእንዳሇበማካተት፣እንዲሁምበዋነኝነትከ1988..."
Primarily, the first objective of this regulation is to give solutions to the squatter settlements established before 1996. Since Regulation No.1 has almost failed to properly address its objectives, the first objective of Regulation No 2 was to address the backdrops of the first. Hence, within this time the city administration has identified more than 73,000 squatter settlements to be upgraded to formal settlements. Here what should be understood is that the number of squatter settlements which were not regularized by the Regulation No.1 of 2000 was around 44,000. However, the second regulation has identified 73,000 settlements to be regularized. This shows that there was an increase of almost 40% or 30,000 squatters. Hence this figure is attributed either to the fact that there were unidentified squatter settlements established before 1996 by Regulation no. 1 or they were new settlements established after the adoption of regulation no 1.

With the high temptation for informal settlements in the city, it can be safe to say that most of the increase in illegal settlements after Regulation No. 1 is due to new illegal construction. For instance, there was an intensified squatting in the years between 2005 to 2007 due to the political instability occurred just after the 2005 national election when the city was under provisional care taker government.

3.2.2.1 Did Regulation No.2 of 2010 Succeed?

Regulation No.2 of 2010 had remarkable achievements in regularizing squatter settlements. It employed both approaches of controlling squatter settlements (preventive and curative approaches). With regards to the first objective the implementation result shows that the regulation has some positive impacts. Primarily, the administration has regularized 80% of squatter settlements. 20% of them were left unregulated by the regulation. Thus it could not fully prevent the expansion of the settlements. This can be implied from the issuance of directive No.17 of 2014 which has the objectives of regularizing around 14000 squatter settlements occupied before 2005. This implies that there are expansions of squatter settlements even after the implementation of regulation no 2 of 2010.

3.3 Demolishing

According to (Daniel Lirebo, 2006), there are two major views regarding the core spatial characteristics and root causes of informal settlements in Addis Ababa. The first line of view, which has been emphasized by the city government, is that most of the informal settlements found in the expansion areas of the city are "non poverty driven "in character. The main essence of this view is, informal settlers in the expansion areas have occupied large plots (on the average 300sq.m) and close to 70% of them have good services (water, electricity, access road and in some cases telephone). In terms of income, most of the settlers are "middle to high income groups' and speculators. In this view informality is not considered as the only domain of the poor; it is also an area of strong groups and networks who have power and influence. On the bases of this assumption, therefore, the city government was emphasizing, “demolition” as a major corrective measure and as the result thousands of housing units were demolished in the past.

The second line of view is the perception held by many scholars and organizations including the World Bank and UNCHS (Habitat). This point of view...
generally perceives informal settlements as "poverty driven" settlements, which have evolved due to a number of socioeconomic and institutional problems. Informal settlements, according to this view, are self-built settlements occupied by people living in the situation of poverty.

As far as informal settlements in the expansion areas of Addis Ababa are concerned, it is not easy to conclude whether they are "poverty driven or not". This is because of the fact that some of these settlements do not have a sign of poverty (rather they are good housing, have large compound and full services) while other are suffering from lack of services, are highly crowded and located at environmentally sensitive areas.

Table 4 Demolished informal settlements in different localities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Woreda</th>
<th>Kebele</th>
<th>Area (in hectare)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kotebe (Kara-Alo) along both sides of the Dessie road</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>112.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotebe (Yeka)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reppi (Kolfe-keraniyo)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>228.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanna Mariam along the left and right side of the ring road</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>288.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliti around the waste water treatment plant (along the river)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Worku Sefer</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meri (south and northern part of the road to Ayat)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>90.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>869.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Daniel Lirebo. 2006).

Because the law enforcement of illegal settlements is not done consistently, affected families tend to reassemble and start all over again. In some cases it has also led to political strife because it led to resistance and anger among the affected.

1 Why squatting continued?

There are a number of reasons for the proliferation of squatter settlements, poverty, high population pressure, aggravated by rural urban migration and weak municipal capacity. Furthermore the proliferation and development of informal settlements is a consequence of multiple factors including the demand supply imbalance in the provision of housing, historical influences and the failure to anticipate this demand, rapid urbanization accompanied by a stagnating rural sector and the absence of adequate levels of economic growth.

Table 5 Major determinants / cause of informality in two sub-cities of Addis Ababa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-City</th>
<th>Leading cause(s)</th>
<th>Secondary causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Issue 15/2019
The lack of ability to pay for the land
There was no conscious effort by city officials to target critical land problems
increased rural urban migration resulting in increased demand for land versus limited supply
increasing levels of poverty
increase in speculative behavior leading to higher prices of land
Over emphasis on land for investment rather than for housing the poor.
Artificial land price

Yeka
Bad governance and corruption
Shortage of land
high land values
Increasing levels of poverty, unemployment and under employment
Inefficient land administration procedures
Increased rent seeking behavior
Weak law enforcement mechanisms
Delays in the land delivery process
High temptation for land occupation
1. Most land allocation procedure based on the bidding system which favours the most affluent, weak law enforcement mechanisms

3.3.2 Elaboration of the Causes of Illegal Land Occupation
As stated repeatedly, many factors have militated against effective land management in the city of Addis Ababa including weak law enforcement, inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy, intervention of brokers and speculators, problems related to the capacity of Land Administration Authority, population pressure and perception problems from the public. Each of these challenges is briefly discussed in the following section.

1. Capacity problems in law enforcement
There are institutional arrangements made to deal with illegal settlements and illegal constructions. One of these is code enforcement unit in the municipality. The most important tasks carried out by law enforcement officers (Demb Askebaris) employed by Kebeles include controlling unauthorized construction. However, the current law enforcement body is poorly equipped, drawn from low profile groups and poorly trained. Some of them cannot even identify forged documents brought to them by the settlers. On the contrary the illegal settlers are sometimes well organized and financially rich to avert attempts of bulldozing. It is an exercise that has generated threats from some residents. As the demolition of illegal settlements is not done consistently, affected families tend to re-assemble and start all over again. Reports indicate that illegal settlers are violent. The recent killings of district administrator and two police officers of Nifas-Silk Lafto sub city is a case in point. The other problem is that the law enforcement unit has many other responsibilities other than controlling squatter settlements. They are responsible for controlling illegal trade and illegal animal slaughtering. They perform this in rounding shifts every three weeks. By the time they come to control illegal settlements, new illegal houses have been built to complicate the matter. Moreover, the settlers bring suspension papers from the court and it takes years until cases are proven illegal. The staffing of code enforcers in one of the sub-cities is indicated in the table below.
The other point reported by one of the city officials is that out of the 6000 employees floated following organizational restructuring in 2003, around 3000 were deployed to the newly created offices such as Code Enforcement and city Sanitation and Beautification Agency. It is not clear whether these new offices were created for the sake of floated employees or whether the new jobs are really meant for the purpose code enforcing. Jobs like code enforcement in such a complex city requires well trained and qualified staff than staff of mediocre quality that floated. There are tangible evidences that the code enforcement group is not doing its job. Squatter settlement, unauthorized building, illegal slaughtering kept on increasing even after this office was established.

2. Inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy

Informal settlements cannot be viewed outside the formal system as it emerges by the weakness in the formal structure. In Addis Ababa Land management was considered as too bureaucratic. This had discouraged people from using legal means and led them to involve in squatter settlements. On the other hand, poor documentation and loss of individual files retarded service delivery process. According to African Development Bank (2009), although the prevalence of corruption in Ethiopia has been historically low, there is a perception that the problem is growing. The Economic Intelligence Unit 2007 Country Report for Ethiopia states that forces of economic liberalization and commercialization appear to have increased opportunities for corruption. Areas prone to rent seeking behavior and corrupt practices include the allocation and leasing of urban land and transactions where rules and procedures are not clearly defined, or regulatory oversight over decisions is weak.

3. Brokers and speculators

Land values, market values of houses and house rents are usually determined by brokers and speculators. The major reason for this is that brokers get commissions based on the prices offered. What makes the matter worse is that some of these brokers do not have any educational background that guides their decisions. The sole logic is to maximize their income by whatever means. The price of land has grown unexpectedly and underutilized land has been spread all over the city. Though the local government did not confirm the figure, it is expected that more land is occupied for the last couple of years being underutilized. The occupiers have claimed that the increase of the cost of building materials, inaccessibility of getting bank loan due to bureaucratic procedures, and the policy itself have contributed for the halt of their investment. Some of the reasons seem right but it may be possible to conclude that they may speculate or in other words they might wait for the increase of land value.

Table 6 Planned and actual staffing in code enforcement in Arada sub-city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Head, code enforcement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Coordinators</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Kebele coordinators</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Code enforcement workers</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Arada sub-city, 2008.
Other types of brokers exploit the regulatory loopholes in land service guidelines. It is indicated that there were dozens of scattered guidelines differently interpreted at different sub-cities. Generally, it can be concluded that the price of land, house and rent of house has appreciated due to the brokers' unhealthy involvement in land related issues which in turn leads some of the people to conquer public land illegally.

4. Perception problems of the public

There is inherent temptation for illegal land holding on the part of the public, hiding documents, bringing forged titles, hiding bank and court suspension papers when asked. Rent seeking behavior has been on the rise in the private market, with the bulk of people resorting to speculative behavior responsible for hiking the value of land parcels. The report of the chamber of commerce indicated the problem as follows: “Auctions are repeatedly reversed; some business actors secure land outside auctions or any other defined and known means; while on the one hand large tracts of urban land are held idle for a very long time by individuals who do not have the capacity to invest, those ready to invest are deterred for lack of it (chamber of commerce, 2007).”

5. Population pressure

Factors such as population increase, rural-urban migration movements and concentration of economic and social services in Addis Ababa have resulted in increasing the demand for housing. In this case population growth has a significant impact on driving up land value which affects housing and property affordability. Due to the population growth the land supply could not meet the demand, as a result many citizens tempted to hold land informally. The oversimplification of urbanization dynamics in Addis Ababa and the absence of national balanced urban development policy holds true for the problem of the mismatch not in housing supply and demand but in other basic urban services.

4. CONCLUSION

One of the most vexing problems confronting many of the developing nations in the world today is the illegal occupation of land. This is generally known by the term "squatting." Its most frequent causes are the great increase in national populations, the surge of people toward the cities, and the incapacity of the affected nations to meet the needs of urban growth by providing the land and housing needed to accommodate their urban newcomers. To secure footholds in the cities, millions of people, in violation of law and ownership rights, have seized land and erected makeshift dwellings. In the cities of the newly emerging countries, squatter settlements are to be seen on hillsides, parks, roadsides, on unplanned land on the urban outskirts and even on valuable land in the cities' centers. As more people pour into the cities and appropriate land, governments are finding it more and more difficult to dislodge them or to prevent it from happening.

Squatter settlements have greatly expanded and contributed to the unplanned and irregular horizontal expansion of the built-up area of the city. In such conditions, formal development and management of the city of Addis Ababa is very difficult. If there is no mechanism to halt such illegal development and illegal subdivision of land by squatter settlements, orderly development of the city will be impossible. The situation of squatting
has a significant implication on urban development on one hand and the situation of the squatters themselves on the other. Various policies and plans have been taken versus informal settlements including those policies that cover wide range from compulsory demolition and withdrawal to construction of low-cost houses and social housing and land and services technique. All of the previously mentioned techniques have not too succeeded because of various reasons.

The researcher assessed the extent of squatter settlements and the measures taken to control them. In order to achieve the objective of this study, secondary data sources were mainly used to analyze the subject. The findings indicate that though the city administration made attempts to prevent the construction of illegal settlements by issuing various regulations, the proliferation of illegal settlements has continued unabated. Thus, demolitions had taken place in parts of the city where preventive measures failed. Both in the implementations of the regulations and demolitions, the city administration faced many problems such as high temptation for illegal construction, population pressure, weak law enforcement and inefficient institutions.

The increase in informal settlements in Addis Ababa can also be associated with lack of enlightenment of the public on planning regulations, unwillingness to accept laid down regulations, and high cost (of money) involved in getting the right land papers.

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